Owner's Interference in Reverse Auction Bidding to Skew a Free Market by Chaudhari, Sushil V.
  
OWNER’S INTERFERENCE IN REVERSE AUCTION BIDDING 
TO SKEW A FREE MARKET 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
by 
SUSHIL VINAY CHAUDHARI 
  
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF SCIENCE  
 
 
 
December 2009 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Construction Management 
  
OWNER’S INTERFERENCE IN REVERSE AUCTION BIDDING 
TO SKEW A FREE MARKET 
 
 
A Thesis 
by 
SUSHIL VINAY CHAUDHARI 
  
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
Approved by: 
Chair of Committee,  John Nichols 
Committee Members, John Peterson 
 Anne Nichols 
Head of Department, Joe Horlen 
 
December 2009 
 
Major Subject: Construction Management
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Owner’s Interference in Reverse Auction Bidding to Skew a Free Market. (December 
2009) 
Sushil Vinay Chaudhari, B.E., College of Engineering, Pune  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John M. Nichols 
Reverse auction bidding is an online auction system. A purchaser’s primary objective in 
using a reverse auction is to obtain the lowest possible bid for goods and services on a 
construction project. With this type of bidding, it is normal that the purchaser will only 
consider price, instead of a bidders’ work history and experience. As a reverse auction is 
an online service, the common misperception is that a purchaser can reach a broader 
market to obtain the lowest possible price. It is a controversial bidding system. No 
previous research has been undertaken by the Texas A&M University Reverse Auction 
Bidding study group into potential owner interference with the bidding system for a 
reverse auction.  
Six bidders were asked to participate in the Reverse Auction Bidding process for a series 
of construction projects in Houston. Each participant was also asked to complete a 
Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test type I and II to determine each participant’s 
personality. After the tests, the six participants competed in an online reverse auction 
bidding game. The primary objective of this research is to analyze the impact of an 
owner’s interference in a reverse auction bidding scenario. In this test, one of the six 
bidders acted as the owner’s surrogate to interfere with an ethical process and reduce the 
owner’s costs. The other five bidders were unaware of the surrogate’s role in the 
bidding. The primary directive given to the surrogate bidder was to drive down the cost 
of the projects. The results for the research study show that the owner’s surrogate can 
affect the bidding process. Interference results in reduced returns for the bidders when 
compared to an uncompromised bidding scenario. It is clear that the method used is 
unethical. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, the construction industry is a competitive business with an excellent supply of 
general contractors, subcontractors, dealers, and suppliers. Recently there has been an 
introduction of a new system of bidding, Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB), which has 
created a great deal of dispute. Some claim that RAB will drive costs down for the 
purchaser; this leads to a lively debate about this method of bidding.  The construction 
industry has been tackling the issues of rising costs, increasing competition, varying 
degrees of experience and quality of work, high failure rates and marginal rates of 
return, but a significant number of construction professionals question whether RAB will 
achieve the nominal objective. This study extends the research work undertaken on RAB 
using game theory at Texas A&M University since 2004.   
In traditional bidding, contract procurement takes place in the form of a sealed bid, 
which was opened at a specified time and a specified place. Both private owners and 
governmental agencies have begun to adopt RAB in an effort to drive down the cost of 
construction. In RAB, each pre-qualified bidder is able to see what the current price for 
the job is and determine if they are able and willing to do the specified work at a lower 
prize. The bidders submit initial prices, which are given a ranking, and all participants 
are informed of their ranking relative to other bids. Bidders can resubmit lower prices as 
many times as they wish until the specified closing time. Once the auction is closed, all 
bidders are notified of the final bid rankings and the dollar value of the winning bid. A 
slightly altered version of this method is used at Texas A&M University to reduce the 
game time to a reasonable period. 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of International Journal of Construction Education and 
Research. 
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According to purchasers, RAB forces contractors to present their lowest prices. 
Opponents of Reverse Auction Bidding claim that construction services cannot be 
treated as commodities and therefore should not be auctioned. They state that 
construction projects are unique and are subject to variables that are not encountered in 
the controlled environment of manufactured goods (Knoll & Thompson, 2002). RAB 
can reduce contractor profit, which may in turn compromise safety and quality at the job 
site (Angelo, 2002). In addition, Reverse Auction Bidding presents the opportunity for 
bid shopping or other forms of bid manipulation. One common complaint of RAB is that 
many firms will be awarded contracts for work that unethical and do not contribute to 
the long-term interest of either the buyer or the seller’ (Harbert, 2003). This research 
study extends the prior RAB work to determine whether a purchaser can affect all of the 
bidder’s profit margins by introducing a surrogate bidder into the game.   
Problem Statement 
This study evaluates the ability of a purchaser’s surrogate in a Reverse Auction Bidding 
process to skew the market with the essential objective of reducing the profit margins of 
the bidders when compared to an open and transparent competition. The research used 
game theory to analyze bidder’s behavior variations during the game as well as 
personality testing to determine if there is a relationship between characters and bidding 
behavior. 
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Research Problem 
A surrogate bidder is introduced into a Reverse Auction Bidding game. The bidding 
game uses the construction of flat concrete on ground house slabs to model a real world 
scenario. The research question is: “Whether a surrogate bidder reduces the profit 
margins for all bidders?” 
Sub-problems 
• Irrespective of the overall change in bidding behavior resulting from the 
surrogate interference, does the personality type have an impact on the profit 
made by an individual bidder relative to the other bidders’ profits? 
• What skew does the surrogate introduce to the market? 
Research Hypothesis 
Can interference by a purchaser’s surrogate affect the result of reverse auction bidding 
process, specifically the profit margins of all other bidders? 
Limitations and Delimitations 
The scope of research study will be limited to following factors: 
• The study is limited to the current graduate students of Construction Science 
Department at Texas A&M University.  
• This study was performed in a controlled setting, limiting the variables that exist 
in the market place, as well as the risk related to the daily transaction of business.  
The controlled setting was necessary in order to establish clear lines for 
evaluating participant behavior patterns. 
• This study does not address any misprint errors, omissions and miscalculations 
that are caused due to participant’s online bidding process. 
• The surrogate’s behavior is clearly unethical and illegal; these issues are set aside 
for the research. 
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Significance of the Study 
The use of Reverse Auction Bidding is growing within the procurement section of the 
construction industry. Previous research has identified behavior patterns of bidders 
during the game play stretching over seven “theoretical” weeks. This study looks at the 
changes to the game play introduced by an unethical behavior on the part of a purchaser. 
This behavior provides a model for review of Reverse Auction Bidding for evidence of 
such behavior in a real situation.  
Definitions 
A number of these definitions are derived from work by Van Vleet (2004). 
Bidder – An entity that submits bid. In this game, there are usually three to ten bidders. 
Bid – A single entry into the game that represents a legally acceptable offer to complete 
the work assuming the bidder has been prequalified.  
Coca Cola Index - An early study in the Reverse Auction Bidding game looked at the 
range of prices paid for a liter of Coca Cola around the world. This index ranged from 1 
to 3.5. This index is used to provide an upper limit to the bidding process in much the 
same manner as published trade rates offer a suggested range of fees. This limit was 
suggested by L. Feigenbaum of Texas A&M University. 
Collusion – A secret agreement between two or more parties for a fraudulent, illegal, or 
deceitful purpose. 
Herfindahl Index - a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the industry and an 
indicator of the amount of competition among them. It is defined as the sum of the 
squares of the market shares of each individual firm. As such, it can range from 0 
to10,000, moving from a very large amount of very small firms to a single monopolistic 
producer. Decreases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a loss of pricing power 
and an increase in competition, whereas increases imply the opposite. The Department 
of Justice considers Herfindahl indices between 1000 and 1800 to be moderately 
concentrated and indices above 1800 to be concentrated. As the market concentration 
increases, competition and efficiency decrease and the chances of collusion and 
monopoly increase. 
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Loss – A negative return applied to a business undertaking after all operating expenses 
have been met. 
Lump Sum offer – A tender submitted for a lump sum amount in the game assumed to be 
for a fixed price. 
Pre-Qualified – The process of declaring competent or capable or to certify in advance. 
Profit – A positive return received on a business undertaking after all operating expenses 
have been met. 
Purchaser – Either an owner or owner’s representative who organizes the bid or tender 
document. 
Reverse Auction Bidding - Single or multiple-item, open, descending-price auction. The 
initiator specifies the opening bid price and bid decrement. Each bidder submits a 
successively lower bid. At the end of the auction, the bidder with the lowest bid is 
assumed to win the auction. 
Second Bidder Issue – Nichols (Personal communication, 2009) has postulated that the 
lowest bidder in Reverse Auction Bidding is seeking to undercut the second bidder by 
the smallest quantifiable fragment, if the bidder understands the principles of tacit 
collusion. 
Sherman Antitrust Act - The act, based on the constitutional power of Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce, declared illegal every contract, combination (in the form 
of trust or otherwise), or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and foreign trade. According 
to Nichols (Personal communication, 2009), the problem is tacit collusion does not fit 
within the meanings of the act, thus leading to the debate about the legality of RAB 
between contractors who consider it illegal or unethical and economists who accept the 
converse.         
Tacit Collusion - Seemingly independent, but parallel actions among competing firms 
(mostly oligopolistic firms) in an industry that achieve higher prices and profits, much as 
if guided by an explicit collusion agreement. Also termed implicit collusion, the 
distinguishing feature of tacit collusion is the lack of any explicit agreement. The key is 
that each firm seems to be acting independently, perhaps each responding to the same 
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market conditions, but the end result is the same as an explicit agreement. This should be 
contrasted with explicit or overt collusion that does involve a formal, explicit agreement. 
Tacit collusion is observed in Reverse Auction Bidding, and is potentially related to the 
Second Bidder Issue. 
Tender – An alternative term for a bid. 
Tender or Bid document – The document prepared to seek bids or tender offers. 
Tenderer - An alternative term for a bidder used in English Contracts. 
Traditional Bidding – In this type of auction all bidders simultaneously submit bids in 
such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest/lowest 
bidder is assumed to be awarded at the price submitted provided no other contracts 
opened on the decision process. 
Winners Curse - Problem faced by uninformed bidders or poor game players. For 
example, in an initial public offering uninformed participants are likely to purchase 
larger allotments of issues that informed participants know are overpriced. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines the Bidding System and the game used at Texas A&M 
University to model RAB in an academic setting. E-sourcing is considered as a popular 
tool for procurement with the far-reaching growth of the internet. In recent years, the 
Reverse (decreasing bids) Auction Bidding process has become an accepted tool, which 
facilitates competitive and collaborative interactions among buyers and suppliers 
through the use of online negotiations (Richard & Elena, 2006). 
Reverse Auction Bidding (“RAB”) is a process in which a buyer of goods and services 
continues to solicit bids from sellers until the buyer is satisfied they have received an 
acceptably low price although time does become a problem that ultimately limits the 
bidding process. In a conventional bidding method, general contractors submit their bids, 
or pre-selected general contractors solicit bids from subcontractors, and there is no 
opportunity for subsequent bidding after the specified time for bid opening. The unique 
feature of Reverse Auction Bidding process is that it communicates the current lowest 
bid to all bidders and invites them to underbid it. This is called transparency in 
economics. In economics, a market is transparent if much is known by many about: 
What products, services, or capital assets are available, What price or prices one can 
offer, Where, and the terms of the contract. There are two types of price transparency: 1) 
I know what price will be charged to me, and 2) I know what price will be charged to 
you. The two types of price transparency have different implications for differential 
pricing. In a RAB, the bid price continues to decrease as long as one bidder is willing to 
underbid the current lowest price. In other words, it is the reverse of typical auctions 
where prospective buyers bid upward (Minnesota Department of Administration, 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 Following are the five steps recommended for executing a successful reverse auction: 
 
Figure 1 Reverse Auction Bidding 
and Carr 2002) 
 
The characteristics of the five steps
Step 1: Clearly define the bid items
This step is similar to traditional purchasing. Specifications, 
documents are prepared by the purchaser to describe the goods/services sought. 
Ambiguity in these documents should be reduced 
chances for a successful transaction. 
Step 2: Find a service provider and 
Buyers should screen service providers and examine their abilities and past performance 
over a wide range of goods and services. Auction execution will be greatly enhanced by 
(Davies 2003; Wagner and Schwab 2003; Smeltzer 
 as shown in figure 1 are: 
 
drawings
as reduced ambiguity
 
set the rules 
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, and bid 
 increases the 
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carefully constructed bidding rules, market clearing rules, and information disclosure 
rules. 
Step 3: Screen, communicate with, and train the bidders 
Bidders should be screened to ensure the quality of the deliverables. It is a good practice 
for the buyer to ensure training to the participating bidders before the auction.  
Step 4: Conduct the auction 
Buyers should ensure the participation of at least three qualified bidders before starting 
the auction. The value of the transaction should be considered while deciding over the 
auction duration. 
Step 5: Award bids 
The buyer should finalize the transaction with the successful bidder in a reasonable time 
period following the closing of an auction. The transaction can be finalized within a few 
hours or days from the bid closing time.  
In the process of “RAB”, bidders are generally required to preregister with the auction 
service provider to receive training in how to participate. They must agree to abide by 
the rules of the auction service provider. Bidders are notified when the bidding period 
opens and are informed about the auction duration. They submit their prices remotely 
from their offices. During the auction, the bidders can view the status of their bid by 
watching the current lowest price as it appears on the web site in real time. Similarly, 
owners also can watch the bidding processes (Thomson & Knoll, 2002). The identity of 
the bidders is not revealed to other bidders and, depending on the auction rules, may not 
be revealed to the owner. 
Nevertheless, Reverse Auction Bidding still remains controversial both within buying 
organizations, among suppliers, and among the academics who study the problem. This 
bidding practice has recently gained popularity among both private and public owners 
and has found its way into the procurement of construction services. Proponents of 
reverse auctions claim that this practice promotes competition and allows buyers to 
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achieve the lowest possible price, thus benefiting the public at large. They believe that it 
will drive down the cost of the project and will save the large amount of money for 
owner. Opponents claim that this practice is nothing more than a modern form of bid 
shopping. They believe that it is harmful to the construction industry because it creates 
an unhealthy business environment, eliminates the benefits of the bid system, promotes 
lower standards of quality performance, delays project completion and reduces job site 
safety (Horlen, Eldin & Ajinkya, 2005). In my opinion, RAB is an acceptable 
economical practice because each of the pre-qualified participants is able to see the 
current price for a given project with the opportunity to place a lower bid within a 
specified time limit. With RAB, the system is instantly efficient because all of the 
information has been revealed to all participants.  
It may possible for the owner to put a fake bidder in the RAB process with the intention 
of driving down the costs. This is unethical behavior and illegal in most places because 
then RAB will not be a transparent process and the bidder who agrees to accept bid 
lower than the cost bade by fake bidder likely to get lesser profit than what minimum he 
should have got. This cannot happen in conventional bidding because all bids are opened 
at one time and whoever has minimum bid gets the project. Figure 2 shows a typical 
screen in an online Reverse Auction Bidding system. In this case, the screen is from the 
research game.  
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Figure 2 Screen Capture of My Bids Information Screen  
 
In a reverse auction, a buyer contracts with a market maker to help make the necessary 
preparations to conduct the reverse auction. This includes: finding new suppliers, 
training new and incumbent suppliers, organizing the auction, managing the auction 
event, and providing auction data to buyers.  
The prices that buyers obtain in the reverse auction reflect the narrow market which it 
created at the moment in time when the auction is held. Narrow market is defined as an 
inactive market which displays large fluctuations in prices due to a low volume of 
trading. Thus, it is possible that better value i.e. lower prices, as well as better quality, 
delivery performance, technical capabilities, etc. could be obtained from suppliers not 
engaged in the bidding or by other means such as collaborative cost management and 
joint process improvement. 
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The buyer may award contracts to the supplier who bid the lowest price. Or, a buyer 
could award contracts to suppliers who bid higher prices depending upon the buyer's 
specific needs with regards to quality, lead-time, capacity, or other value-adding 
capabilities. However, buyers frequently award contracts to incumbent (i.e. current) 
suppliers, even if prices are higher than the lowest bids, because the switching costs to 
move work to a new supplier are higher than the potential savings that can be realized. 
This outcome, while very attractive to buyers, is often strongly criticized by both new 
and incumbent suppliers. 
Reverse auctions are used to fill both large and small value contracts for public and 
private commercial organizations. In addition to items traditionally thought of as 
commodities, reverse auctions are also used to source buyer-designed goods and 
services, and has even been used to source reverse auction providers. 
Jap (2003) provides quantitative evidence that suppliers tends to become suspicious 
about buyers opportunism, which adversely affects the owner – bidder relationship in a 
Reverse Auction Bidding. Jap (2007) further reports that only 5 percent of the people 
they interviewed suggested that reverse auction process can improve relationships which 
means that rest 95 percent will hamper it. Engelbrecht – Wiggans (2007) argue that as 
there are repeated interactions between owner and bidders in the whole bidding process, 
where bidder’s behavior gets affected by issues external to the auction like gaining a 
strategic position over other bidders and the buyer always an economic issue. Jap (2007) 
conducted research on aggressiveness of bidder by considering various factors such as 
total number of bids a supplier make, the rate of making bids and degree of price 
concessions they offer and concluded: 
“Suppliers who are interested in making specific investment with buyer and also those 
who want to develop long term relationship with the buyer will submit few bids, bid at 
greater intervals, and make less reduction in profit margin in the entire bidding process 
compared to rest of the suppliers.”  
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“Suppliers who frequently submitted bids and made heavy reductions in profit margin 
have lower propensity of relationship post-auction with the buyer which suggest that 
reverse auction is a “negative price haggling” process.”  
“Strategic bidding behavior of suppliers in which they appear to trade off potential 
economic and rational investments is long term exchange with short term pricing 
concessions.” 
There were several other key findings regarding reverse auction in Jap’s (2007) research:  
“As the number of bidders in the auction increases, suppliers lose interest in reverse 
auction bidding process and tend to bid less aggressively.”  
The reasons for this issue are yet to be determined but the researcher indicates that 
bidders become skeptical and start to assume the presence of non-qualified bidders 
bidding in the reverse auction process. Further, Jap (2007) says that there may be 
possibility that if number of supplier exceed in bidding process, bidders may lose 
interest, refuse to bid against non-responsible bidders and start looking for alternative 
buyers. Decreases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a loss of pricing power and 
an increase in competition, whereas increases imply the opposite. The Department of 
Justice considers Herfindahl indices between 1000 and 1800 to be moderately 
concentrated and indices above 1800 to be concentrated. As the market concentration 
increases, competition and efficiency decrease and the chances of collusion and 
monopoly increase. The fewer the number of competitors in a market the higher the 
index score (Van Vleet, 2004). 
“Total number of cumulative bids submitted in the competition, raise in total bids, 
submission rate of bids and price concession offered by bidders suggest that bidders 
bidding in the competition were responsive.”  
The bidding aggressiveness changes with respect to number of bidders and total duration 
of the event of reverse auction. According to Staw (1976), “Bidding aggressiveness is 
responsible to total number of bids by others may represent a psychological escalation of 
commitment”. Jap (2007) states that “Supplier’s frequency of bidding decreases with 
14 
 
increase in duration of event of reverse auction which could affect overall price savings 
for the buyer.”  
In summary, there appears to be a lot of unresolved issues for Reverse Auction Bidding 
in terms of the ethics, operation, and interference. Whilst this issue is quite common for 
new technologies, on bidding methods, the concerns about true transparency will remain 
for some time until the industry matures. 
The Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test provides a measure of personality. This research 
extends on work by Chouhan (2009) on bidder’s personality and the impact on a RAB 
game. Table 1 lists the different personality types of the Keirsey Temperament Sorter.  
 
Table 1 Different Personality Aspects and Temperaments as per KTS  
 
Temperament Role Role Variant 
Introspective 
(N) 
Idealist (NF) 
Diplomatic 
Mentor (NFJ) 
Developing 
Teacher (ENFJ): 
Educating 
Counselor (INFJ): 
Guiding 
Advocate (NFP) 
Mediating 
Champion (ENFP): 
Motivating 
Healer (INFP): 
Conciliating 
Rational (NT) 
Strategic 
Coordinator (NTJ) 
Arranging 
Field marshal 
(ENTJ): Mobilizing 
Mastermind (INTJ): 
Entailing 
Engineer (NTP) 
Constructing 
Inventor (ENTP): 
Devising 
 
Architect (INTP):         
Designing 
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Table 1 Continued 
 Temperament Role Role Variant 
Observant 
(S) 
Guardian (SJ) 
Logistical 
Administrator (STJ) 
Regulating 
Supervisor (ESTJ): 
Enforcing 
Inspector (ISTJ): 
Certifying 
Conservator (SFJ) 
Supporting 
Provider (ESFJ): 
Supplying 
Protector (ISFJ): 
Securing 
Artisan (SP) 
Tactical 
Operator (STP) 
Expediting 
Promoter (ESTP): 
Persuading 
Crafter (ISTP): 
Instrumenting 
Entertainer (SFP) 
Improvising 
Performer (ESFP): 
Demonstrating 
Composer (ISFP): 
Synthesizing 
 
 
Table 2 provides the meaning of the letters used to define different personality types. 
 
Table 2 Meaning of Group of Letters in Personality Code 
Letter Name Meaning 
E Extraversion Feel motivated by 
interaction with people. 
Tend to enjoy a wide circle 
of acquaintances, and gain 
energy in social situations 
16 
 
Table 2 Continued 
Letter Name Meaning 
N iNtuition More abstract than concrete. 
Focus attention on the big 
picture rather than the 
details, and on future 
possibilities rather than 
immediate realities 
F Feeling Value personal 
considerations above 
objective criteria. When 
making decisions, often give 
more weight to social 
implications than to logic 
J Judgment Plan activities and make 
decisions early. Derive a 
sense of control through 
predictability 
I Introversion Quiet and reserved. 
Generally prefer interacting 
with a few close friends 
rather than a wide circle of 
acquaintances, and expend 
energy in social situations 
P 
 
 
 
 
 
Perception Withhold judgment and 
delay important decisions, 
preferring to "keep their 
options open" should 
circumstances change 
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Table 2 Continued 
Letter Name Meaning 
 
T 
 
Thinking 
 
Value objective criteria 
above personal preference. 
When making decisions, 
generally give more weight 
to logic than to social 
considerations 
S Sensing More concrete than abstract. 
Focus attention on the 
details rather than the big 
picture, and on  
immediate realities rather 
than future possibilities 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research methodology has been divided into three subcategories: 
Part 1 – Data Collection, Step 1 
Part 2 – Data Collection, Step 2   
Part 3 – Data Collected 
  
Data Collection Step 1: Keirsey Temperament Sorter 
Each individual was asked to take the Keirsey Temperament Sorter (KTS) Test and the 
results were analyzed using standard procedures. The information about personality type 
of a bidder involved in the game process was collected in order to compare the 
personality types against the returns made in the game. The KTS Test covers all the 
personal characteristics and long-term behavioral patterns as defined by two different 
definitions of the personality. It evaluates public, social, or behavioral characteristics of 
a person along with his private, central, and inner core values. KTS also defines the 
systematic analysis of personality aspects that include the individual’s interests, 
orientation, values, self image, and social roles. (Chouhan, 2009). The individual 
bidder’s personality type is shown in table 3.  
 
Table 3 Individual Bidder’s Personality Type 
Bidder's User 
Name 
Temperament 
Sorter Personality 
Code 
Temperament Role Variant Role 
Concrete 
Company 
ISTJ 
Guardian 
(Logistical) 
Administrator 
(Regulating) 
Inspector 
(Certifying) 
Copper Company 
 
ISFJ 
Guardian 
(Logistical) 
Conservator 
(Supporting) 
Protector 
(Securing) 
 
19 
 
Table 3 Continued 
Bidder's User 
Name 
Temperament 
Sorter Personality 
Code 
Temperament Role Variant Role 
Driver Company ISFJ Guardian 
(Logistical) 
Conservator 
(Supporting) 
Protector 
(Securing) 
Log Company ISFJ Guardian 
(Logistical) 
Conservator 
(Supporting) 
Protector 
(Securing) 
Pliers Company ESTJ 
Guardian 
(Logistical) 
Administrator 
(Regulating) 
Supervisor 
(Enforcing) 
Rove Company ESTJ 
Guardian 
(Logistical) 
Administrator 
(Regulating) 
Supervisor 
(Enforcing) 
 
 
Data Collection Step 2: Data Set from Simulation 
Reverse Auction Bidding software was designed by Van Vleet, (2004) using an ASP 
interface and Microsoft Access database so that all the bidders could bid from remote 
locations over the internet. The design of the software is such that the data collected is 
aggregated at a central and single location using Microsoft Access database and then 
transferred into Microsoft Excel for further analysis. This data is now collected using a 
SQL Server 2005 database to allow simultaneous access for multiple projects. This 
system was developed for Gregory’s research in 2008. 
The Scenario 
The bidding process was designed and developed to involve two categories in the 
bidding game; the owner and the bidder. The owner’s profile in this game process is: 
The owner is an established homebuilder in the Greater Houston area and he is looking 
forward to some new developments in his area of expertise. In this entire game process 
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the job is really easy and manageable as it requires the builders to construct only one 
type of home which requires pouring one type of slab for each home.  
The profile of the bidder in this game process is: 
The bidder’s role is to submit his bids during the game process to gain business against 
his competitors. All bidders are provided with an initial bank amount of $40,000. They 
are supposed to submit their bids while considering the realistic scenarios such as rain 
delays, travel and delivery charges, delays due to distant projects and other variables that 
affect the day to day business particularly in the construction industry.  The main 
objective for the bidders during the game process is to generate maximum profit.  
Game Details 
The simulation contains a set of instructions provided to the bidders in the game process. 
It also includes the details, description and variables that affect the project and its 
duration.    
1. The total duration of the game scenario in this setting will be a maximum of nine 
consecutive weeks. 
2. All bidders initially have an equal dollar amount of $40,000 available in their 
bank accounts. 
3. The base cost for each job has been estimated by a competent estimator as 
$10,000. This cost does not include any applicable travel and delivery charges. 
The amount of these excluded costs will be posted on web site for each job along 
with some other relevant details such as job site address, access information and 
other details necessary to commence the job on time. 
4. The default duration to complete each job is five scenario days of construction 
time, excluding rain periods. 
5. Work week begins on Monday and ends on Saturday. The work week is six days 
long. 
6. All bidders are limited to work on three jobs per week.  However, if they desire 
to work on more than three jobs per week they then have to take a loan out to 
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finance for each additional job.  The additional borrowing charges are $500 
which will be charged automatically every time they borrow a loan irrespective 
of whether they win a job or not. 
7. Since the base cost for all jobs is $10,000, and the default duration is five days, 
each bidder makes $2000 per day for all jobs.  This construction cost will be 
accrued on daily basis. In addition, travel expenses and delivery charges are also 
accrued on a daily basis, as is determined by the job site location.   
8. The main office of the owner is located in Sugarland and the travel and delivery 
expenses will be determined on the basis of distance of job site from this location 
as all subcontractors have offices within a mile of the owner. 
9. The minimum acceptable return on investment derived from long term 
construction industry standards is 10 percent.   
10. Payment for work is scheduled to be delivered at the completion of the fifth 
construction day. 
11. Start of bidding times will be determined by a consensus of all participants.  
They will have exactly 15 minutes to place bids.   
12. The main objective of all the bidders is to maximize their profits, whilst maintain 
bank confidence and acceptable liquidity. 
Rain Delay 
1. There will be no additional charges for any delays. Houston has a significant 
amount of rain during the months of May, June, and July which is the national 
construction period for the game. 
2. Any rain delays will cost one day of construction for that specific job.  However, 
because no work is being performed, it also means that no costs are being 
incurred. This condition is the most contagious as it assures other work is 
available.   
3. Statistics providing information for the probability of rain in the Houston area in 
mid-June through late-July is collected from National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA, 2009). It stated that Houston has a probability of 
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receiving approximately 35 percent of rains in this duration. Consequently, there 
is a 35 percent chance of delay in construction on any given day. This statistic is 
used to derive a rain delay vector. 
Figure 3 shows the probability of rain for Houston during the game period. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Probability of Rain in Houston Area in Mid June Through late July  
 
Rain can have a significant impact on the progress of the reverse auction bidding game. 
Bidding strategies must vary as rain causes delays on completion of some jobs for the 
current construction week. The alternative is to take a bank loan that provides a value for 
a lost rain day at $500. Delays caused due to rain can reduce the default capacity of the 
bidder to bid three jobs every week. A job is listed as an Incomplete Job if it is not 
completed in the same week in which it was bid due to rain delays. A bidder has the 
nominal capacity to bid for only two additional jobs for that week if there is one 
incomplete job in the current week (excluding any bank loan).  The rain delay was 
directly linked to site locations on a particular day. The rain data for week 1 is shown in 
table 4. 
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Table 4 Rain Data for Week 1  
 
Day Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Monday 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Tuesday 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Wednesday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thursday 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Friday 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Saturday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Site Locations 
The six development areas selected were Brookside Village, Piney Point Village, 
Highlands, Jersey Village, Bunker Hill Village, and Richmond (Van Vleet 2004). These 
areas are shown in figure 4.  
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Figure 4 Site Locations  
Source: (MapQuest, 2009) 
 
As mentioned earlier, travel and delivery costs are dependent on the distance of these 
locations from owner’s office in Sugarland. Each of these locations has different project 
costs that include construction costs as well as travel and delivery costs.  
The six selected development areas and their respective distances from the 
Homebuilder’s main office are listed in table 5. Table 5 also shows the travel and 
delivery costs associated with these locations. 
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Table 5 Development Areas Distance from Home Builder’s Main Office in Sugarland, 
Houston and Their Respective Travel Cost and Delivery Cost 
 
 
Site # Location of 
Development 
Distance from 
Sugarland (miles) 
Travel Cost 
($) 
Delivery 
Cost ($) 
Total Cost 
($) 
Site 1 
Brookside 
Village 
42 858 624 1482 
Site 2 
Piney Point 
Village 
24 495 360 855 
Site 3 Highlands 70 1452 1056 2508 
Site 4 Jersey Village 40 825 600 1425 
Site 5 
Bunker Hill 
Village 
27 561 408 969 
Site 6 Richmond 14 297 216 513 
 
 
Web Site Description 
In 2004, Robert Van Vleet created a website using ASP programming which was 
connected to a database using Microsoft Access. This site was used to run the online 
simulation of the bidding game. This website allowed participants to input their bid 
information, and would also collect the data for the analysis of the bidding behavior. 
Details of the ASP programming are given in the paper by Gregory (2006), and Shanker 
(2005). Gregory (2006) encountered significant problems with the Microsoft Access 
database as he tried to get the bidders online at once. An alternative SQL Server 2005 
database was configured for the game site. 
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A domain location was created on the Texas A&M University’s College of Architecture 
server to host the reverse auction game where each participant enters the system and 
they assigned a login screen with username and password entry boxes. Each participant 
was provided with a unique login name, being: Driver, Pliers, Concrete, Rove, Copper, 
and Log. Each participant had a unique password to control access to the site.  These 
specific login name and password allowed each participant to enter the website. 
However, it limited their access to the information that was relevant only to their 
bidding. After starting their login session, the participants were taken to the “All Current 
Bids” screen.  
Figure 5 shows the “All current bids” screen. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Screen Capture of All Current Bids Screen  
 
This screen provides bid information such as location and related cost for each job. The 
information provided on this page was identical for all participants. It contained all of 
the information pertaining to the available jobs for that week. This screen provides the 
information about the current bid price, estimated profit and name of the current bidder. 
This screen served as the bidding screen where participants would enter their bids in the 
white boxes located under the "My Price" column.   
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Random dice rolls using three dice were used to determine the number of jobs that were 
available each week. Previous studies had also used dice to determine the number of jobs 
per week.  
In the design of the web page, allowances made such that the bidding process should 
minimize the erroneous information given to the bidders. The relevant information 
includes the cost of the job, all current bids, and the bidder’s company name. In addition, 
no bids could be placed before bidding time was set to commence, or after bidding was 
closed. Bidding occurred for a 15 minutes period, the system was closed for 5 minutes.  
Bidders were instructed to refresh computer screens to keep abreast of current status of 
the active bids because of the limitations of the internet browsers. One major 
modification required in the website for future bidding process is the introduction of 
automatic refresh application of the web page, which automatically updates itself at 
previously decided fixed interval of time. This helps to keep the bidders regularly 
updated about the bid status and its relevant bid price. This identified problem of timing 
of bids over the internet as one of the ethical issues that should be considered. 
As discussed earlier, participants were restricted to bid on only three jobs per week. 
However, they can increase this number and acquire an additional job above their 
financial capacity by utilizing the option of borrowing money/taking a loan from the 
bank. This option was made available to each participant during actual bidding process. 
The program is set to ask the participant if they would like to borrow money once their 
capacity is full. Upon accepting the bank guarantee, a fee of $500 was deducted from the 
bidders account located on the “My Bids Info” page as shown in figure 6.  
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Figure 6 Screen Capture of Bank Guarantee  
 
Since this is a reverse auction process, protocols are established to ensure that only a 
lower value is accepted in the bidding process. If someone erroneously bids a higher 
value than the current bid value, the program displays the screen shot shown in figure 7 
which warns that a bidder is entering a higher bid amount than the current lowest bid 
amount is not allowed.   
 
 
 
Figure 7 Screen Capture of Higher Bid  
 
At the end of the active bidding period, which was established as 15 minutes, jobs were 
automatically assigned to the bidder with the lowest values for each job.  This 
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information about the bids won by any particular bidder is displayed on his “My Bids 
Info” page under the “My Jobs in Progress” bar as shown on figure 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Screen Capture of “My Bid Info” Page  
 
As shown in figure 8, “My Bid info page” displays the bid and job information relevant 
to a particular bidder. Participants were able to have access to this page throughout this 
game process and they were encouraged to visit it frequently. This page contains job 
relevant information which helps the participant to ensure their job status. This page 
includes,  
1. All active jobs that participant has won, under the category “My Jobs in 
Progress”,  
2. Jobs that participant is bidding, under the category “My active bids”. All 
information under this tab came directly from “All Current Bids” page, so this 
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also provides the current status of the bidding game to show whether the 
participant had been outbid on a particular job.  
3. List of all successfully completed jobs, under the category “My Completed 
Jobs”.  
Along with the above mentioned information, it also shows the financial state of the 
participant, which helps him in framing his future strategies such as how many jobs he 
could bid for, and if he is already lagging behind due to his uncompleted jobs, how much 
money he would have to borrow from bank and other financial institutions to bid for a 
job in the following week.  This financial information is provided under the category 
“My Summary”. The information is: 
1. Current calculated cash assets 
2. Capacity for additional works including jobs with bank guarantees 
3. Cumulative loan charges till date 
Current financial condition provides the working capital information to the participants. 
It is calculated by deducting costs of current jobs and bank loans from the profits of 
completed jobs.  
The formula used is: 
Current Financial Condition = Capital Money + Profits from Completed Jobs – Costs of 
current jobs in progress – Bank Guarantees   
Where, Capital Money   = $40,000 and Bank Guarantee = $ 500 / Loan 
 
 
31 
 
Figure 9 Screen Capture of All Completed Jobs  
 
The job historical information for the Reverse Auction Bidding process was provided 
under “My Completed Jobs” tab as shown in figure 9.  
This information was utilized by participants to determine their progress and financial 
success or failure. This information was also utilized to plan and execute strategies that 
would help to gain additional jobs in future.  It includes: 
1. Bid date along with start day and end day 
2. Job location, and bid cost  
3. Profit and associated percentages 
4. Rainy days and associated number of delays 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS  
Background 
This chapter presents the results and the analysis of the results for a Reverse Auction 
Bidding game. The game used the web based ASP at SQL Server 2005 program 
developed at Texas A&M University as part of an ongoing research program into RAB 
theory of practice. 
A six participant Reverse Auction Bidding game was conducted at the College of 
Architecture of Texas A&M University. All six participants had given the Keirsey 
Temperament Sorter (KTS) Test prior to the RAB game. The KTS results showed that 
three of the bidders were Administrators and three of the bidders were Conservators 
personality types.  
Panchal (2008) and Chouhan (2009) showed evidence of four different trends in bidding 
behavior during the period of the game play. These trends are Learning Trend, 
Discovering Trend, Competitive Trend, and Profit Gain Trend. They observed that these 
patterns of trend were different when bidders were new to Revere Auction Bidding as 
compared to experienced persons playing the game. Bidders were bidding at the lower 
prices when the game started. It is because they did not know how to play the game. But 
when they get used to the game, they started competing against each other to win the job 
(Machado, 2009). Personality types of six players are shown in table 6. Three players 
had previously taken part in a RAB game. 
 
Table 6 Personality Types of All Six Participants 
Type Name 
Administrator Pliers Co. 
Administrator Rove Co. 
Administrator 
Concrete 
Co. 
Conservators Log Co. 
Conservators Copper Co. 
Conservators Driver Co. 
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Previous research suggested that participants having personality as “Administrator” 
performed better in the bidding. Previous research findings have provided a starting 
point for this research. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Bidders’ Percentage Profit against Job Identification Number 
 
A plot of the job number against the job profit is shown in figure 10. The game consisted 
of two research stages. Stage 1 consisted of normal bidding from job number 951 
through job number 992, which is equivalent to six game weeks. Stage 2 consisted of the 
unethical period where Pliers Co. acted as a purchaser agent with the express objective 
of driving the price down. Stage 2 occurred from job number 993 to the end of the play.  
This study showed four different trends in bidding behavior as had been observed in 
previous researches: 
 
 
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
9
5
1
9
5
4
9
5
7
9
6
0
9
6
3
9
6
6
9
6
9
9
7
2
9
7
5
9
7
8
9
8
1
9
8
4
9
8
7
9
9
0
9
9
3
9
9
6
9
9
9
1
0
0
2
1
0
0
5
1
0
0
8
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
4
1
0
1
7
1
0
2
0
1
0
2
3
1
0
2
8
Job Identification Number
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
P
ro
fi
t
34 
 
1) Learning Trend: 
This trend was observed from Job Id 951 to 959. The bidding behavior through these 
jobs is called as “learning” trend. During this period, some participants were in the initial 
phase of learning the Reverse Auction Bidding game process. This trend covered the 
first week of bidding. In this trend, new participants tended to keep prices low. 
2) Discovery Trend: 
The next trend was observed in week 2 which started with Job Id 960 through 968 which 
is termed as a “discovering” trend. An average rate of return for this period was 37 
percent. During this period, most of the participants raised their initial bidding price and 
remaining players were observed to discover the game process of bidding at an upper 
limit. 
3) Competitive Trend: 
This trend lasted from Job Id 969 to 992 which is termed as a “competitive” trend. An 
average rate of return for this period was 137 percent. By this point, all participants had 
fully understood the game process and they were competing with each other to obtain 
the job. The average rate at which participants outbid other participants increased at this 
stage. This period sees the start of the classic bidding strategy adopted by the better 
players. 
4) Profit Gain Trend (Interference Period): 
The fourth trend started from week five with Job Id 993 and continued till the end of the 
bidding. The average rate of return for this period was 17.6 percent. At this stage all 
participants had reached a mature level of play in the game, although some were clearly 
better players than the others. Players are observed to develop their own strategies to 
maximize their individual profits. It was observed during this period that all bidders 
were not participating from the beginning and they started to reserve their bids until the 
last minute of bid closing. This period of play is different from the play behavior 
observed in first three weeks.  This time bidders tended to wait for the best available 
opportunity to enter the game so as not to reveal their preferences and strategies. After 
Job Id 993, the owner’s surrogate interfered in the bidding process. He deliberately tried 
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to bid at lower prices. In this way, owner could get the maximum benefit. At the end of 
fourth week, the profit gained for each job was much lower than it was observed till 
week three. Average profit gained in Week Three was 140 percent and that of Week 
Four was 22 percent. This fall in average profit shows owner’s interference can affect 
the bidding behavior of participants. In addition, it is observed that bidders tended to 
wait for the best available opportunity to enter the game so as not to reveal their 
preferences and strategies. 
Individual Bidder’s Win Percentage 
The winning percentage of each individual bidder was determined and shown in table 7. 
There were total 93 jobs available for reverse auction bidding and six bidders, Concrete 
Co., Copper Co., Driver Co., Log Co., Pliers Co., and Rove Co. participated.  
 
Table 7 Percentage Jobs Won by Bidder 
Contractor ID Bids Won Bids Won % 
Concrete Co. 12 12.9 
Copper Co. 10 10.7 
Driver Co. 25 26.8 
Log Co. 25 26.8 
Pliers Co. 9 9.6 
Rove Co. 12 12.9 
Total Bids 93 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 11 shows the percentage of jobs won by each individual bidder.
 
Figure 11 Percentage Win by 
 
A high rate of winning bids does not always translate into higher profits.
comparison, winning one thousand of jobs at a single unit of profit is much worse than 
winning one job at a thousand
but the job win rate multiply by the job profit rate to yield a total re
success is measured by turnover of profit, not just turnover.
Further a combined analysis of all the bidders was done to find out percentage win by 
individual bidder.  Figure shows that every bidder was successful in implementing 
his/her own strategies which provided them with considerable number of winning bids. 
Maximum number of bids are won by Log Co. and Driver Co. Further, Rove Co. and 
Concrete Co. won 12 bids each
Pliers Co. won the lowest number of bids. Since Pliers Co. was the owner’s 
representative, its goal was not to win jobs but to lower down the profit margin of other 
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 of profit. The important thing is not just the job win rate, 
  
.  Second lowest number of bids are won by Copper Co. 
12.9
10.7
26.8
12.9
Concrete Co.
Copper Co.
Driver Co.
Log Co.
Pliers Co.
Rove Co.
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participants. In comparing the number of bids won by each individual and their 
personalities, it can be said that Guardians are better bidders than Rationals.  
Comparison of Total Profit Earned by Individual Bidder to the Bidder’s 
Personality 
A comparison was made of bidder’s personality against the total profit earned by each 
individual bidder to determine whether bidder personality has an impact on the level of 
return. The table 8 and figure 12 show the data for all the bidders with their average 
profit percentage and the total profit earned. 
 
Table 8 Average Percent Profit and Total Profit  
Contractor's 
Name Contractor's Profit % Avg Total Profit in $ 
Concrete Co. 63 119,395 
Copper Co.  20 27,374  
Driver Co. 28 96,862  
Log Co. 36 126,982  
Pliers Co. 98 121,779  
Rove Co. 90 137,555  
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Figure 12 Average Profit Percentages per Job Won by Each Individual Bidder 
 
When this profit analysis was compared to the bidder’s personality types, it was found 
that Rove Co. and Pliers Co. having a temperament of a Guardian with a role of 
Administrator were successful in gaining maximum average profit per job compared to 
other bidders. Concrete Co. which has a temperament of Guardian with a role of 
Inspector managed to get average profit just above the average profit of all the bidders. 
While Copper Co., and Log Co. having a temperament of Guardian with a role of 
Protector failed to obtain an average profit that was above the average profit of all the 
bidders.  In conclusion, the companies which have a role of Administrator and variant 
role as Supervisor are the most successful in the bidding process whereas the company 
that has a role of Conservator and variant role as Protector has a lower average profit. 
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Figure 13 Total Profit Earned by Each Individual Bidder 
 
Figure 13 shows the total profit for each participant.  The average of total profits earned 
by all bidders was $104,991. The total profit earned by Rove Co. is five times higher 
than the total profit earned by Copper Co. Rove Co., Pliers Co., and Log Co. are called 
“economically effective” bidders as they earned the highest profits. Concrete Co., Driver 
Co., and Copper Co. have earned a profit lower than average total profit. These three 
bidders are called “economically ineffective” bidders, although Concrete Co. is close to 
upper three, but its average profit was slightly lower.  
By comparing the total profits earned by individual with their personality types, it is 
confirmed that Administrators generally make higher profit in reverse auction when 
compared to Conservators.  
Comparison of Individual Bidder’s Personality Based on Loan Taken 
The graph shown below displays the loan amount taken by individual bidder in the 
whole reverse auction bidding process. Every bidder had equal opportunity to utilize 
banker’s guarantee by taking loan to increase bidder’s capacity of handling jobs. 
However, some bidders made optimum use of it while some bidders hardly used it. This 
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was because, every time when they took bank loan, they had to pay $500 as a bank 
guarantee which was bit risky. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Loans Taken by Each Individual Bidder 
 
Figure 14 shows the loan taken by each bidder. In comparing the graph of loans taken 
with total profit earned graph, it appears that companies that have taken higher loan 
amount have won more jobs. In addition, it is observed that except for Driver Co., total 
profit earned by each company increased with total loan amount. The conclusion is that 
Guardians with a role of Administrator included some risk factor in their strategies to 
win more jobs and earn higher levels of profit. 
Analysis of an Individual Bidder  
Next step was to analyze each individual bidder to study their bidding trend and analyze 
them. The objective was to identify any change in their bidding strategy over the nine 
week game duration. Specifically it was evaluated whether there was any significant 
change in the bidding pattern from start till the end of the bidding process for each 
participant. 
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Table 9 shows Concrete Co.’s bidding data for the game. 
 
Table 9 Concrete Company’s Bidding Data 
bidID jobID 
Construction 
Cost in $ 
Bid 
Amount 
in $ 
Contractor's 
Profit in $ 
Cumulative 
Profit in $ 
% 
Contractor's 
Profit 
% Average 
Contractor's  
Profit  
2280 952 11701 11850 149 149 1.3 
62.9 
2281 959 12835 12989 154 303 1.2 
2488 970 14725 41999 27274 27577 185.2 
2570 983 18316 47999 29683 57260 162.1 
2581 985 18316 46999 28683 85943 156.6 
2582 987 13213 27999 14786 100729 111.9 
2925 1000 11701 18000 6299 107028 53.8 
2928 1001 14725 18800 4075 111103 27.7 
2919 1005 14725 19999 5274 116377 35.8 
3693 1033 12365 12000 -365 116012 -3.0 
3652 1035 13762 14000 238 116250 1.7 
3691 1043 14855 18000 3145 119395 21.2 
Total Profit Earned by Concrete Co. 119395       
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Figure 15 shows the profit percentage for Concrete Company over the game period. 
 
 
Figure 15 Concrete Company’s Profit Percentage History 
 
During the learning phase, Concrete Co. did not obtain a high profit level. But, from the 
Competitive phase, Concrete Co. started to gain relatively higher profit levels. During 
this phase, company won the jobs with 185 percent, 162 percent, 156 percent, and 112 
percent profit margins. Concrete Company saw a slight fall in their profit margin when 
the owner’s surrogate interfered in the bidding process. This result implies that the 
owner’s interference had a negative impact on bidder’s bidding strategy. The average 
profit at which revenues are generated for Concrete Company is 62.9 percent per job 
while total profit gained was $119,395.   
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Table 10 Copper Company’s Bidding Data 
bidID jobID 
Construction 
Cost in $ 
Bid 
Amount 
in $ 
Contractor's 
Profit in $ 
Cumulative 
Profit in $ 
% 
Contractor's 
Profit 
Average 
Contractor's  
Profit % 
2262 957 14914 14985 71 71 0.5 
19.6 
2431 965 14914 20500 5586 5657 37.5 
2421 966 13213 18800 5587 11244 42.3 
2667 994 11701 14999 3298 14542 28.2 
2653 997 13213 14900 1687 16229 12.8 
2924 1006 14725 20900 6175 22404 41.9 
2927 1007 18316 20900 2584 24988 14.1 
3169 1021 11701 12900 1199 26187 10.2 
3168 1022 12835 12900 65 26252 0.5 
3500 1027 13865 14987 1122 27374 8.1 
Total Profit Earned by Copper Co. 27374       
 
Figure 16 shows the profit percentage for Copper Company over the game period. 
 
Figure 16 Copper Company’s Profit Percentage History 
 
Copper Co. only got one job with $71 profit margin during the learning stage as shown 
in table 10. During the first week, Copper Co. did well when they gained a 0.5% total 
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profit which was an above average profit for the whole group. In the competitive stage, 
Copper Co. had already formulated its own strategies that could equip them to win more 
jobs with larger profit margins. But in the final stage, the owner’s interference clearly 
made some adverse effects on the performance of Copper Co. in winning more jobs. 
This was caused by Copper Co.’s minimal loan borrowed from the bank that affected the 
increase of its job capacity. Copper Co.’s average revenue for every job was at 19.6% 
and the total profit was at $27,374. 
 
Table 11 Driver Company’s Bidding Data 
bidID jobID 
Construction 
Cost in $ 
Bid 
Amount 
in $ 
Contractor 
Profit in $ 
Cumulative 
profit in $ 
% 
Contractor's 
Profit 
Avg 
Contract
or's  
Profit % 
2385 962 14914 18998 4084 4084 27.4 
27.7 
2428 964 11701 15000 3299 7383 28.2 
2576 982 14914 39000 24086 31469 161.5 
2584 990 14725 31000 16275 47744 110.5 
2656 992 11701 17000 5299 53043 45.3 
2671 993 18316 20000 1684 54727 9.2 
2672 995 13213 17999 4786 59513 36.2 
2668 996 18316 19994 1678 61191 9.2 
2914 1003 11701 18000 6299 67490 53.8 
2910 1004 11701 18000 6299 73789 53.8 
2922 1008 14914 19000 4086 77875 27.4 
2896 1011 14725 18000 3275 81150 22.2 
2899 1012 14725 18000 3275 84425 22.2 
3178 1013 18316 19000 684 85109 3.7 
3182 1014 18316 18316 0 85109 0.0 
3185 1015 14725 14725 0 85109 0.0 
3188 1016 14725 15000 275 85384 1.9 
3116 1018 18316 17000 -1316 84068 -7.2 
3488 1024 13213 15000 1787 85855 13.5 
3496 1028 14914 17000 2086 87941 14.0 
3459 1029 14955 16500 1545 89486 10.3 
3501 1030 13213 13500 287 89773 2.2 
3676 1034 14575 18499 3924 93697 26.9 
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Table 11 Continued 
bidID jobID 
Construction 
Cost in $ 
Bid 
Amount 
in $ 
Contractor 
Profit in $ 
Cumulative 
profit in $ 
% 
Contractor's 
Profit 
Average 
Contractor's  
Profit % 
3690 1038 13754 12985 -769 92928 -5.6 
 
3681 1042 14955 18889 3934 96862 26.3 
 
Total Profit Earned by Driver Co. 96862    
 
Figure 17 shows the profit percentage for Driver Company over the game period. 
 
 
Figure 17 Driver Company’s Profit Percentage History 
 
Driver Co. had engaged in Reverse Auction Bidding process before. Since Driver 
Company was competing with relatively new bidders for this bidding, it was able to 
obtain 27% and 28% of profit for the first two jobs it won as shown in table 11. 
However, in the competitive phase, things started to change when the new bidders were 
gradually getting acquainted with the bidding process. But this did not hinder Diver Co. 
from earning a 161% and 110% profit for just wining a few number of jobs. At the latter 
part of the bidding, Diver Co. decided to focus on getting more jobs regardless of profit 
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margin. Being an experienced bidder, Diver Co. was still influenced by the owner as 
seen on Job Id 1008 to 1042. By the initial phase, Diver Co. was already out of money 
and had no job capacity. But the moment the company acquired some loans and made an 
effort to increase its job capacity, it was able to obtain higher profit margin. Despite this, 
the revenue of Diver Co. was just at 27.7% per job which is below the total average of 
all the bidders and the profit was at $96,862 which is not considered to be a significant 
amount compared to other bidder’s profits.   
 
Table 12 Log Company’s Bidding Data 
bidID jobID Construction 
Cost in $ 
Bid 
Amount 
in $ 
Contractor's 
Profit in $ 
Cumulative 
profit in $ 
% 
Contractor's 
Profit 
Average 
Contractor's  
Profit % 
2213 951 12835 12500 -335 -335 -2.6 
36 
2273 954 14914 14800 -114 -449 -0.8 
2209 955 12835 12500 -335 -784 -2.6 
2274 956 13213 12990 -223 -1007 -1.7 
2275 958 13213 13100 -113 -1120 -0.9 
2429 961 12835 17300 4465 3345 34.8 
2409 963 12835 18920 6085 9430 47.4 
2391 967 18316 23488 5172 14602 28.2 
2432 968 14725 20400 5675 20277 38.5 
2491 975 14914 38950 24036 44313 161.2 
2578 981 14725 38000 23275 67588 158.1 
2583 986 12835 36000 23165 90753 180.5 
2666 998 13213 18000 4787 95540 36.2 
2918 999 13213 17900 4687 100227 35.5 
2926 1002 13213 19300 6087 106314 46.1 
2912 1009 14725 18999 4274 110588 29.0 
2884 1010 14914 19999 5085 115673 34.1 
3181 1020 14914 15999 1085 116758 7.3 
3470 1023 13213 15998 2785 119543 21.1 
3486 1031 13213 13500 287 119830 2.2 
3620 1032 14656 18999 4343 124173 29.6 
3665 1037 13213 13589 376 124549 2.8 
3684 1039 13865 12998 -867 123682 -6.3 
3692 1040 14725 18750 4025 127707 27.3 
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Table 12 Continued 
bidID jobID Construction 
Cost in $ 
Bid 
Amount 
in $ 
Contractor's 
Profit in $ 
Cumulative 
profit in $ 
% 
Contractor's 
Profit 
Average 
Contractor's  
Profit % 
3687 1041 14725 14000 -725 126982 -4.9 
 
Total Profit Earned by Log Co. 126982    
 
Figure 18 shows the profit percentage for Log Company over the game period. 
 
 
Figure 18 Log Company’s Profit Percentage History 
 
Log Co. started to win projects in the learning stage but in spite of this, company was 
still experiencing losses. At first, Log Co. was not knowledgeable on how to place bids 
for jobs. As a result, it made the lowest bids during the starting phase of the game in 
order to win jobs without considering obtaining higher profits. By the time Log Co. was 
learning about the process during the competitive stage, it acquired 161%, 158% and 
180% profit margin as shown in table 12. This was the turning point for the Log 
Company. Log Company’s primary goal was to gain the maximum number of jobs and 
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they became successful in achieving this with 25 jobs won which is 27% of the total 
jobs. To supplement this, Log Co. availed loans during the bidding process. But when 
the owner interfered, the profit margin declined significantly. Because of the impact of 
the owner’s interference, Log Co. was only able to get jobs but no profits for the last 
stage of the bidding process. The revenue of Log Co. was at 36% per job and a profit of 
$126,982 which is the second to the highest profit generated among all the bidders.  
 
Table 13 Pliers Company’s Bidding Data 
bidID jobID 
Construction 
Cost in $ 
Bid 
Amount 
in $ 
Contractor's 
Profit in $ 
Cumulative 
profit in $ 
% 
Contractor's 
Profit 
Average 
Contractor's  
Profit % 
2482 972 14914 28000 13086 13086 87.7 
98.1 
2489 976 11701 28500 16799 29885 143.6 
2472 977 14914 33000 18086 47971 121.3 
2503 978 13213 31000 17787 65758 134.6 
2497 979 14914 31000 16086 81844 107.9 
2493 980 14914 31500 16586 98430 111.2 
2572 989 13213 25000 11787 110217 89.2 
2567 991 13213 25000 11787 122004 89.2 
3499 1026 14725 14500 -225 121779 -1.5 
Total Profit Earned by Pliers Co. 121779       
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Figure 19 shows the profit percentage for Pliers Company over the game period. 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Profit Percentage History of Pliers Company 
 
Pliers Co. was a representative of its owner throughout the bidding process. Its goal was 
to reduce the profit margin of the participants instead of winning bids so that owner can 
obtain maximum benefits. From week one to week three, Pliers Co. acted like a normal 
bidder. Pliers Company bid for the jobs and won some of the jobs those were available 
in the first three weeks of the bidding game as it can be seen from table 13. By week 
four, the owner’s surrogate interfered in the bidding process. Owner’s surrogate started 
to bid in lower values to decrease the profit margin. This strategy created a negative 
impact on the participants. So, they tried to counter the bids of Pliers Co. by bidding 
lower than Pliers Co.’s bids. Therefore, it can be concluded that Pliers Co. was able to 
successfully achieve their primary objective. During the last stage of the game, the profit 
margin was significantly reduced to the point that other bidders tried to win as many jobs 
as possible without considering the profit which yielded losses from some jobs.  
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Table 14 Rove Company’s Bidding Data 
bidID jobID 
Construction 
Cost in $ 
Bid 
Amount 
in $ 
Contractor's 
Profit in $ 
Cumulative 
Profit in $ 
% 
Contractor's 
Profit 
Average 
Contractor's  
Profit % 
2277 953 11701 11000 -701 -701 -6.0 
89.4 
2430 960 11701 17452 5751 5050 49.1 
2495 969 18316 32499 14183 19233 77.4 
2498 971 11701 36422 24721 43954 211.3 
2502 973 11701 37452 25751 69705 220.1 
2438 974 14914 35000 20086 89791 134.7 
2579 984 11701 30299 18598 108389 158.9 
2553 988 13213 34599 21386 129775 161.9 
3183 1017 11701 14499 2798 132573 23.9 
3187 1019 11701 13599 1898 134471 16.2 
3495 1025 11701 13999 2298 136769 19.6 
3654 1036 13213 13999 786 137555 5.9 
Total Profit Earned by Rove Co. 137555       
 
 
Figure 20 shows the profit percentage for Rove Company over the game period. 
 
 
 
Figure 20 Profit Percentage History of Rove Company 
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Rove Co. was one of the experienced participants in the game. Since its competitors 
were newcomers, it had to lose first to win the job for week one. By the middle stage of 
the bidding, it already yielded 211% and 220% of profit margin as it can be seen from 
table 14. It was able to make revenues of 89% per job which was above average and a 
total profit of $137,555 which was the highest generated profit among all bidders. In 
order to do this, Rove Co. acquired loans from the bank to improve its job capacity and 
to win 12 jobs. However, Rove Co. also experienced some losses when the owner 
interfered during the last stage of the bidding.  
Figure 21 shows the cumulative total profit for each bidder. 
 
 
 
Figure 21 Cumulative Total Profit of Each Bidder 
 
Amongst the bidders, Rove Company was relatively consistent throughout. This 
company used only one strategy through the game. The inconsistent player was Log 
Company. Log Company changed its strategy from time to time to win the maximum 
number of jobs and was successful, but it earned less profit per job. 
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Table 15 shows jobs available per week and their distribution of winning bids.  
 
Table 15 Jobs Available and Jobs Won by Each Individual Bidder 
Week 
Available 
Jobs per 
week 
Jobs won  
Concrete 
Co. 
 Copper 
Co. 
Driver 
Co. 
 Log 
Co. 
 Pliers 
Co. 
Rove 
Co. 
1 9 2 1 0 5 0 1 
2 9 0 2 2 4 0 1 
3 12 1 0 0 1 6 4 
4 11 3 0 2 2 2 2 
5 7 0 2 4 1 0 0 
6 14 3 2 5 4 0 0 
7 10 0 2 5 1 0 2 
8 9 0 1 4 2 1 1 
9 12 3 0 3 5 0 1 
TOTAL 
JOBS 93 12 10 25 25 9 12 
 
 
The critical observation on the bidding strategy is: 
Pliers Company who was owner’s surrogate started interfering from fourth week. Since 
its job was to lower the bidding amount of other bidders, it did not try to win jobs from 
fourth week as it can be seen from above table. The owner’s surrogate is the most 
successful if it wins almost no jobs, but drives the prices down to a point where the other 
companies outbid the surrogate. Log Company won at least one job in each week.  
Table 16 shows the number of bids and the individual distribution of bidder who made 
those bids on weekly basis. 
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Table 16  Total and Individual Number of Bids Made by Bidder per Week 
Week 
Total 
Bids per 
week 
Bids made per week by 
Concrete 
Co. 
 Copper 
Co. 
Driver 
Co. 
 Log Co. 
 Pliers 
Co. 
Rove 
Co. 
1 123 15 27 12 33 12 24 
2 151 26 42 14 30 18 21 
3 71 12 4 7 11 11 26 
4 81 12 7 14 11 11 26 
5 88 9 19 16 22 20 2 
6 256 33 17 47 64 31 64 
7 260 19 33 32 59 59 58 
8 313 36 51 33 83 63 47 
9 192 39 16 13 61 39 24 
TOTAL 
BIDS 1535 201 216 188 374 264 292 
 
 
It is clear that the number of bids per job increased significantly when the owner’s 
surrogate started interfering in the bidding process. In the eighth week, bidders were 
competing with each other so much that the total bid number for this week reached 313, 
which is the highest number in any of the weeks. The bids dropped in the last week may 
indicate a frustration with either the game or the interference. The owner’s surrogate 
indicated after the research game that there were significant amount of highly negative 
comments about the surrogate’s behavior. Due to the confidentiality of the bid system, 
the other bidders did not know who the surrogate was, nor were they aware of the 
deliberate attempt at unethical behavior. 
 
Figure 22 shows the number of jobs available per week and the number of bids per 
week.  
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Figure 22 Jobs/Bids per Week vs Week 
 
Table 17 shows the success rate of each bidder. 
 
Table 17 Success Rate of Individual Bidder per Week 
Week 
Success rate of bidders (Jobs won v/s Jobs available)   
Concrete 
Co. 
Copper 
Co. 
Driver 
Co. Log Co. 
Pliers 
Co. Rove Co. 
Total 
Jobs % 
1 22 11 0 56 0 11 100 
2 0 22 22 44 0 11 100 
3 8 0 0 8 50 33 100 
4 27 0 18 18 18 18 100 
5 0 29 57 14 0 0 100 
6 21 14 36 29 0 0 100 
7 0 20 50 10 0 20 100 
8 0 11 44 22 11 11 100 
9 25 0 25 42 0 8 100 
Summation 
of 
Percentage 104 107 253 243 79 113 900 
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The success rate was calculated by dividing the total jobs won by the bidder to the total 
jobs available in that respective week. Further, success rate of each bidder was 
calculated by totaling the success rate of each week.  
Table 18 shows bidders’ bidding rate per week. 
 
Table 18 Bidders’ Bidding Rate per week 
Week 
Bidders’ Bidding Rate per Week   
Concrete 
Co. 
Copper 
Co. 
Driver 
Co. Log Co. 
Pliers 
Co. Rove Co. 
Total 
Bids 
1 12 22 10 27 10 20 100 
2 17 28 9 20 12 14 100 
3 17 6 10 15 15 37 100 
4 15 9 17 14 14 32 100 
5 10 22 18 25 23 2 100 
6 13 7 18 25 12 25 100 
7 7 13 12 23 23 22 100 
8 12 16 11 27 20 15 100 
9 20 8 7 32 20 13 100 
TOTAL 
BIDS 123 130 112 207 149 179 900 
 
 
Above table shows the individual bidders bidding rate per week. The bidder’s rate was 
calculated by dividing the number of times the bidder bided for different jobs in a week 
to total number of bids in that respective week.  Further the sum of all the bidding rates 
per week was calculated to find out whether bidder adopted aggressive way or strategic 
way to win jobs. 
It was observed that Log Co. was the most aggressive among all the bidders. Rove Co. 
and Pliers Co. were of average aggression. While comparing the above data with the 
personalities, it was observed that Guardians with a role of Conservators and variant role 
as Protectors were more aggressive in bidding than Administrators with a variant role as 
Supervisors. Although, Guardian with a variant role as Inspector which was Concrete 
Co. showed less than average aggression but played strategically.   
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To sum up, it can be said that the bidders who bid aggressively are the ones who won 
most of the jobs as compared to those who prefer biding strategically. Personalities who 
made higher profits in reverse auction bidding are also the aggressive bidders as well as 
the personalities with lower profits are the ones who preferred strategic bidding rather 
than aggressive bidding. So logically speaking, bidding mainly depends on the bidder’s 
rate of aggression in bidding.  
Table 19 shows the ratio of the success rate to the bid rates. 
 
Table 19 Ratio of Success Rate to Bidding Rate 
Ratio of Success Rate to Bidding Rate 
  
Concrete 
Co. 
Copper 
Co. 
Driver 
Co. Log Co. 
Pliers 
Co. 
Rove 
Co. 
Total Week 
% 
Success 
Rate 104 107 253 243 79 113 900 
Bidding 
Rate  123 130 112 207 149 179 900 
Ratio 0.8455284 0.823076 2.25892 1.1739 0.5302 0.6312 1 
 
This table is a different representation of the data. The success rate has been normalized 
to 100 for each week. This ratio can be used at an early stage to detect poor bidding 
practice and good bidding practice. 
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Figure 23 Success Rate and Bidding Rate of Each Individual Company  
 
After comparing success rate with bidding rate of each bidder, it was observed that 
Driver Co. and Log Co. with a temperament of Guardian and role of Conservator 
showed less aggression than the jobs they won. Pliers Company, who was an owner’s 
representative, was least successful in winning jobs. The summery of success rate and 
their respective personalities is as follows: 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The study of Reverse Auction Bidding has been undertaken at Texas A&M University 
since 2004, starting with the Robert Van Vleet. This research has progressed to a stage 
of considering the impact of bidder’s personality on the outcome of the Reverse Auction 
Bidding game. The research on Reverse Auction Bidding previously has shown that a 
gain obtained over seven weeks passes through a series of stages. This current research 
showed evidence of the traditional stages of play which are learning, discovering, 
competitive, and profit gain phases. 
This research looked at two specific problems. The first problem was whether bidder’s 
personality had an impact on the relative returns. Bidder’s personality was measured 
using the Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test. The results show that bidder’s personality 
type is a strong indicator of total returns. A personality type of Administrators generally 
performs better. These findings contain the observations made by previous researchers. 
The second stage of this research related to owner’s interference in the game play. The 
game was allowed to develop normally for three weeks, after that time an owner’s 
surrogate interfered with the reverse auction. The results showed a drop in average profit 
after the start of the interference. 
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APPENDIX A 
KEIRSEY TEMPERAMENT SORTER TEST 
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The Keirsey Temperament Sorter 
 
For each question, decide on answer a or b and put a check mark in the proper column of 
the answer sheet.  Scoring directions are provided.  There is no right or wrong answers 
since about half the population agrees with whatever answer you choose.   
 
1. When the phone rings do you 
a. hurry to get to it first 
b. hope someone will answer 
2. Are you more 
a. observant than introspective 
b. introspective than observant 
3. Is it worse to  
a. have your head in the clouds 
b. be in a rut 
4. With people are you usually more 
a. firm than gentle 
b. gentle than firm 
5. Are you more comfortable in 
making 
a. critical judgments 
b. value judgments 
6. Is clutter in the workplace 
something you 
a. take time to straighten up 
b. tolerate pretty well 
7. Is it your way to  
a. make up your mind quickly 
b. pick an choose at some length 
8. Waiting in line, do you often 
a. chat with others 
b. b.  stick to business 
9. Are you more 
a. sensible than ideational 
b. ideational than sensible 
10. Are you more interested in  
a. what is actual 
b. what is possible 
11. In making up your mind are you 
more likely  
a. to go by data 
b. to go by desires   
12. In sizing up others do you tend to 
be 
a. objective and impersonal 
b. friendly and personal 
13. Do you prefer contracts to be 
a. signed, sealed, and delivered 
b. settled on a handshake 
14. Are you more satisfied having 
a. a finished product 
b. work in progress 
15.   At a party, do you 
a. interact with many, even 
strangers 
b. interact with a few friends 
16.   Do you tend to be more 
a. factual than speculative 
b. speculative than factual 
17. Do you like writers who 
a. say what they mean 
b. use metaphors and symbolism 
18. Which appeals to you more: 
a. consistency of thought 
b. harmonious relationships 
19. If you must disappoint someone are 
you  
a. usually frank and 
straightforward 
b. warm and considerate 
20. On the job do you want your 
activities 
63 
 
a. scheduled 
b. unscheduled 
21. Do you more often prefer 
a. final, unalterable statements 
b. tentative, preliminary statements 
22. Does interacting with strangers 
a. energize you 
b. tax your reserves 
23. Facts 
a. speak for themselves 
b. illustrate principles 
24. Do you find visionaries and 
theorists 
a. somewhat annoying 
b. rather fascinating 
25. In a heated discussion, do you 
a. stick to your guns 
b. look for common ground 
26. Is it better to be 
a. Just 
b. merciful 
27. At work, is it more natural for you 
to 
a. point out mistakes 
b. try to please others 
28. Are you more comfortable 
a. after a decision 
b. before a decision 
29. Do you tend to 
a. say right out what’s on your 
mind 
b. keep your ears open 
30. Common sense is 
a. usually reliable 
b. frequently questionable 
31. Children often do not 
a. make themselves useful enough 
b. exercise their fantasy enough 
32. When in charge of others do you 
tend to be 
a. firm and unbending 
b. forgiving and lenient 
33. Are you more often 
a. a cool-headed person 
b. a warm-hearted person 
34. Are you prone to 
a. nailing things down 
b. exploring the possibilities 
35. In most situations are you more 
a. deliberate than spontaneous 
b. spontaneous than deliberate 
36. Do you think of yourself as 
a. an outgoing person 
b. a private person 
37. Are you more frequently 
a. a practical sort of person 
b. a fanciful sort of person 
38. Do you speak more in  
a. particulars than generalities 
b. generalities than particular 
39. Which is more of a compliment: 
a. “There’s a logical person” 
b. “There’s a sentimental person”  
40. Which rules you more 
a. your thoughts 
b. your feelings 
41. When finishing a job, do you like to 
a. tie up all the loose ends 
b. move on to something else 
42. Do you prefer to work 
a. to deadlines 
b. just whenever 
43. Are you the kind of person who 
a. is rather talkative 
b. doesn’t miss much 
44. Are you inclined to take what is 
said 
a. more literally 
b. more figuratively 
45. Do you more often see 
a. what’s right in front of you 
b. what can only be imagined 
46. Is it worse to be 
a. softy 
b. hard-nosed 
47. In trying circumstances are you 
sometimes 
a. too unsympathetic 
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b. too sympathetic 
48. Do you tend to choose 
a. rather carefully 
b. somewhat impulsively 
49. Are you inclined to be more 
a. hurried than leisurely 
b. leisurely than hurried 
50. At work do you tend to 
a. be sociable with your colleagues 
b. keep more to yourself 
51. Are you more likely to trust 
a. your experiences 
b. your conceptions 
52. Are you more inclined to feel 
a. down to earth 
b. somewhat removed 
53. Do you think of yourself as a  
a. tough-minded person 
b. tender-hearted person 
54. Do you value in yourself more that 
you are 
a. reasonable 
b. devoted 
55. Do you usually want things 
a. settled and decided 
b. just penciled in 
56. Would you say you are more 
a. serious and determined 
b. easy going 
57. Do you consider yourself 
a. a good conversationalist 
b. a good listener 
58. Do you prize in yourself 
a. a strong hold on reality 
b. a vivid imagination 
59. Are you drawn more to 
a. fundamentals 
b. overtones 
60. Which seems the greater fault 
a. to be too compassionate 
b. to be too dispassionate 
61. Are you swayed more by 
a. convincing evidence 
b. a touching appeal 
62. Do you feel better about 
a. coming to closure 
b. keeping your options open 
63. Is it preferable mostly to  
a. make sure things are arranged 
b. just let things happen naturally 
64. Are you inclined to be 
a. easy to approach 
b. somewhat reserved 
65. In stories do you prefer 
a. action and adventure 
b. fantasy and heroism 
66. Is it easier for you to 
a. put others to good use 
b. identify with others 
67. Which do you wish more for 
yourself: 
a. strength of will 
b. strength of emotion 
68. Do you see yourself as basically 
a. thick-skinned 
b. thin-skinned 
69. Do you tend to notice 
a. disorderliness 
b. opportunities for change 
70. Are you more 
a. routinized than whimsical 
b.  whimsical than routinized  
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 a b  a b  a b  a b  a b  a b  a b 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
8   9   10   11   12   13   14   
15   16   17   18   19   20   21   
22   23   24   25   26   27   28   
29   30   31   32   33   34   35   
36   37   38   39   40   41   42   
43   44   45   46   47   48   49   
50   51   52   53   54   55   56   
57   58   59   60   61   62   63   
64   65   66   67   68   69   70   
 1   2 3     4 3   4 5   6 5   6 7   8 7   
         
 
 
 
 
   2                              
3 
  4                               
5 
  6                               
7 
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Directions for Scoring 
 
1. Add down so that the total number of a answers is written in the box at the bottom 
of each column.  Do the same for the b answers you have checked.  Each of the 14 
boxes should have a number it. 
2. Transfer the number in box #1 of the answer grid to box #1 below the answer 
grid.  Do this for box # 2 as well.  Note, however, that you have two numbers for 
boxes 3 through 8.  Bring down the first number for each box beneath the second, as 
indicated by the arrows.  Now add all the pairs of numbers and enter the total in the 
boxes below the answer grid, so each box has only one number. 
3. Now you have four pairs of numbers.  Circle the letter below the larger numbers of 
each pair.  If the two numbers of any pair are equal, then circle neither, but put a 
large X below them and circle it. 
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TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 
DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND GRADUATE STUDIES - OFFICE OF RESEARCH COMPLIANCE 
1186 TAMU, General Services Complex  
College Station, TX 77843-1186  
750 Agronomy Road, #3500 
979.458.1467 
FAX 979.862.3176 
http://researchcompliance.tamu.edu 
 
Human Subjects Protection Program    Institutional Review Board 
 
 
DATE: 10-Sep-2009 
 
MEMORANDUM 
  
TO: CHAUDHARI, SUSHIL VINAY 
 77843-3578 
  
FROM: Office of Research Compliance 
 Institutional Review Board 
  
SUBJECT: Initial Review 
 
Protocol 
Number: 
2009-0561 
  
Title: 
Owner's Interference in Reverse Auction Bidding to Skew 
a Free Market 
  
Review 
Category: 
Expedited 
  
Approval 
Period: 
10-Sep-2009 To 09-Sep-2010 
 
Approval determination was based on the following Code of Federal 
Regulations: 
 
45 CFR 46.110(b)(1) - Some or all of the research appearing on the list and found 
by the reviewer(s) to involve no more than minimal risk. 
------------ 
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not 
limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, 
communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research 
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employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human 
factors evaluation or quality assurance methodologies. 
 
(Note: Some research in this category may be exempt from the HHS regulations for 
the protection of human subjects. 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2) and (b) (3). This listing 
refers only to research that is not exempt.)  
 
 
 
 
Provisions:  
 
 
This research project has been approved for one (1) year. As principal investigator, 
you assume the following responsibilities 
1. Continuing Review: The protocol must be renewed each year in 
order to continue with the research project. A Continuing Review 
along with required documents must be submitted 30 days before the 
end of the approval period. Failure to do so may result in processing 
delays and/or non-renewal. 
2. Completion Report: Upon completion of the research project 
(including data analysis and final written papers), a Completion 
Report must be submitted to the IRB Office. 
3. Adverse Events: Adverse events must be reported to the IRB Office 
immediately. 
4. Amendments: Changes to the protocol must be requested by 
submitting an Amendment to the IRB Office for review. The 
Amendment must be approved by the IRB before being implemented. 
5. Informed Consent: Information must be presented to enable 
persons to voluntarily decide whether or not to participate in the 
research project. 
This electronic document provides notification of the review results by the Institutional Review Board. 
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